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LIMITATIONS ON AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES
Holder In Due Course
Of all creditor practices currently being criticized by consumer
advocates, the one which has elicted the greatest outcry is the time-
honored doctrine of holder in due course.' Under Louisiana negotiable
instrument law, when a third party in good faith acquires a promis-
sory note, which is in proper form, for value and without notice of any
infirmity or defect, he becomes a holder in due course.' Such a status
permits the assignee to enforce the obligation free from any personal
defenses and equitites which may have existed between the original
parties.:' This doctrine developed in commercial settings in which
both parties were aware that, normally, the instrument would be
transferred into credit channels. In this context, holder in due course
is a valid means of obtaining the commercially desirable goal of maxi-
mum negotiability of commercial paper.4
Unfortunately, what began as an incentive to generate confi-
dence in negotiable paper has become an end in itself when used in
consumer transactions. Retailers found that by taking negotiable
notes in consumer installment sales, they would be able to discount
the paper to finance companies who would then become holders in
due course. Thus, if the goods were defective or even never delivered,5
the consumer would still be liable for the full amount of the note
thereby denying consumers their only viable remedy short of a law
suit-refusing to pay until the contract is fulfilled. In this context,
the holder in due course status has been called an "aberration" ' and
''statistically unnecessary. '
1. Hartmann and Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer,
77 CoM. L.J. 116 (1972); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1968); Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses:
Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272 (1969); W. MAGNUSON
AND J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 1118 (1968): "The single factor
most responsible for consumer injustices is the holder in due course doctrine."; Com-
ment, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 285 (1968). REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF.
2. LA. R.S. 7:52 (1950).
3. Id. 7:57 (1950).
4. Hartmann and Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer,
77 CoM. L.J. 116 (1972).
5. NCCF at 34; Comment, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 285 (1968).
6. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954).
7. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 445, 473 (1968).
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The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) and the National
Consumer Act (NCA)9 both took positions aimed at limiting the nego-
tiability of consumer paper. The NCA offers the greater protection for
consumers by not only prohibiting the use of negotiable instruments
in consumer transactions," but also by providing that assignees
would be subject to "all defenses and claims of the consumer."" The
UCCC does not make such an assault on the holder in due course
doctrine. While it does forbid the taking of negotiable instruments in
consumer credit sales or leases, it does not abolish holder in due
course status if the assignee acquires the instrument without notice
that it was executed in connection with a consumer transaction.'
The UCCC reduces its protection even further by offering two
alternatives regarding a consumer's ability to raise claims or defenses
against an assignee if there are waiver of defenses clauses in the
contract. The first alternative would limit an assignee's liability to
the amount outstanding, and such defenses or claims as the consumer
has could only be raised as a defense or set-off.'3 The second alterna-
tive provides even less protection for the consumer. It requires the
consumer to raise any defenses he has within three months after
notice of an assignment has been delivered to him. If he does not
assert his defenses within this period, the assignee can enforce the
obligation free from any defenses, thereby effectively becoming a
holder in due course.'
The Louisiana Consumer Credit Act'5 is much more creditor-
oriented than even the weakest alternative possible under the
UCCC" and makes little substantive change in existing negotiable
8. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code was drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It was approved at the National Conference
of Commissioners' annual conference in 1968 and by the American Bar Association in
August, 1968.
9. The National Consumer Act was prepared by the National Consumer Law
Center, Boston College Law School and was adopted in 1969.
10. National Consumer Act § 2.405 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NCAI.
11. Id. § 2.406.
12. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.403 Ihereinafter cited as UCCC]. But
see UCCC WORKINc. REDRAFT No. 5, TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT (Nov. 1973). This proposed
revision would ban the use of negotiable instruments in a consumer credit sale or lease
(section 3.307), and would be enforced by making the assignee who takes a negotiable
instrument in violation of section 3.307 subject to all claims and defenses that the
consumer would have against the seller.
13. UCCC § 2.404(A).
14. Id. § 2.404(B).
15. LA. R.S. 9:3510-68 (Supp. 1972).
16. See the Opinion of Attorney General of May 29, 1973, to Lieutenant Governor
Fitzmorris wherein it is noted that "these statutes constitute the Louisiana version of
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instrument law." Even so, several provisions do provide some protec-
tion for the consumer. One change adds a new "form" requirement
for an instrument to be negotiable.' Under the Act, if an instrument
involved in any consumer credit transaction, except home solicitation
sales'' or those involving seller or lender credit cards, is to be negotia-
ble, it must have the words "Negotiable Paper" printed on its face.3
Failure to do so renders the instrument non-negotiable. 2' Seemingly,
this additional form requirement is intended to inform consumers
that the note being signed is likely to be assigned and that thereafter
the obligation will be to a finance company. However, this "aware-
ness" is basically illusory as the words "negotiable paper" have
meaning only to persons acquainted with the practices and laws af-
fecting the concept of negotiability. Also, there is no requirement as
to size, color or placement of the wording; consequently, it is likely
to be included in fine print.
One new limitation is placed on holders in due course: a require-
ment that notice be given to the consumer that his note is being
assigned, and that he has 30 days in which to raise any complaints,
claims or defenses arising out of the original transaction.22 If the
consumer does not notify the assignee within the 30-day period, the
defenses are considered to have been "waived" and the assignee be-
comes a holder in due course."' The statute requires that the notice
of assignment contain a specified warning24 and inform the consumer
as to the consequences of a failure to raise available defenses within
the period.,' The 30-day period between giving of notice and becom-
ing a holder in due course should also be applied to any subsequent
a model Uniform Commercial Credit Code suggested for enactment by the American
Law Institute."
17. LA. R.S. 7:1-195 (1950).
18. The Louisiana form requirements under existing Negotiable Instrument Law
are found in R.S. 7:1.
19. LA. R.S. 9:3532 B (Supp. 1972). This could be a potentially important exclu-
sion from negotiability. For a discussion see notes 78-82 and accompanying text infra.
20. LA. R.S. 9:3532 A (Supp. 1972).
21. Id.
22. LA. R.S. 9:3534 (Supp. 1972).
23. Id. 9:3533, 3534(3) (Supp. 1972).
24. Id. 9:3534(2) (Supp. 1972). "Are the terms of the contract described above
correct? Are the goods or services contracted correct? Are the goods or services con-
tracted for as they were represented to you? If not, you should notify us giving specific
details within 30 days from the date the above notice was mailed." This warning is
required to be in no less than the equivalent of tenpoint bold face type.
25. Id. 9:3534(3) (Supp. 1972).
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transferees who acquire either before notice has been given or before
the period has passed.
The statutory warning does not offer much protection from un-
scrupulous businessmen. The wording of the warning would not seem
to adequately inform most consumers as to its true meaning and
scope; not only because of the legalistic terminology used, but also
because of the almost universal lack of understanding among con-
sumers as to the legal ramifications of wording such as
the assignee or transferee or any subsequent assignee or trans-
feree will have the right to enforce the contract free of any claims
or defenses you may have against the extender of credit.2"
Furthermore, the thirty-day period is too short to protect con-
sumers who are sold defective goods as most defects in even the
poorest quality merchandise usually are not discovered so quickly. A
complete failure to perform would seem to be the only claim which
would normally arise during this period.27 In the event the assignee27 .1
fails to give the 30-day notice, or should the notice fail to contain the
required notice, the intent of the warning requirement should pre-
clude an assignee from becoming a holder in due course until the
proper notice is given."
The Act does make one very major change in Louisiana's law of
negotiability by redefining the "good faith" required for assignees of
consumer paper to attain holder in due course status. Under this
provision, the assignee does not acquire in "good faith" if he has
knowledge of substantial complaints by other consumers of the
extender of credit's failure or refusal to perform his contracts with
them and the extender of credit's failure to remedy his defaults
2)
26. Id.
27. In many transactions where the seller's obligation is not expected to be imme-
diately performed, as where a later delivery is promised, the 30-day period may have
been long past before the consumer has even a suspicion that there will be total non-
performance. See also NCCF at 36.
27.1. LA. R.S. 9:3534 (Supp. 1972). "An instrument taken pursuant to a consumer
credit sale may be assigned or transferred to a third person provided that the original
assignee or transferree gives written notice that the instrument has been assigned or
transferred." (Emphasis added.)
28. This could be analogized to the consumer's right to cancel a home solicitation
sale until the seller has given the statutorily required notice. See also UCCC WORKING
REDRArT No. 5 § 3.404 (Nov., 1973) (which would make the assignee liable to consumer
claims and defenses if the assignee took a negotiable instrument in violation of section
3.307 which restricts negotiability of consumer paper.)
29. LA. R.S. 9:3534(3)(a) (Supp. 1972).
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Because the Louisiana negotiable instruments law requires "actual
knowledge" to constitute notice of an infirmity or defect in the note, :
Louisiana courts may insist that the "knowledge" contemplated in
section 3534 of the Act be "actual." However, such a judicial inter-
pretation would not be in keeping with the basic purposes of the Act.
It would seem that this provision is an attempt abrogate the "empty
head":" view of holders in due course and should at least be given
enough scope to include Better Business Bureau and Credit Bureau
reports or even what could be said to be common knowledge of the
business community."2 This interpretation would deny protection to
finance companies who buy paper from known unscrupulous compa-
nies yet not affect the ability of honest retailers to assign credit in-
struments.
Ordinarily, finance companies are in a much better position than
consumers to determine retailers' business practices and reputation
because the lending agencies are constantly involved with retail
credit transactions and because of the availability of investigative
staff personnel. The finance companies are also able to bring far more
concerted pressure on retailers to stop shoddy practices than are or-
ganized consumers, and are much more able to absorb, and thereby
spread out over all consumers, the losses caused by defaulting sellers.
Not only are finance companies able to protect themselves by investi-
gating the merchants from whom they buy notes, but they can also
protect themselves by requiring that endorsors be liable should con-
sumers raise defenses within the thirty-day period (so-called "thirty
day recourse paper") and by establishing bad debt reservesto protect
against defaults by sellers.
One additional consumer protection device which could be de-
rived from the Louisiana Consumer Law would have to be judicially
created. The doctrine of "close connexity" has never been adopted in
Louisiana, :'' although it has received much favorable comment. The
basic idea of "close connexity" was well expressed in Unico v. Owens:"
where the court stated:
The more the holder knows about the underlying transactions
30. Id. 7:56.
31. Note, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1200 (1939); Note, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 457, 461 (1970).
32. This reasoning could be extended to include constructive knowledge of the
public records as they apply to retail sales establishments (for example, several law-
suits against one seller for failure to live up to his obligations).
33. See Comment, 18 LA. L. REV. 322 (1958); Note, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 457 (1970).
See also note 36 infra.
34. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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and particularly the more he controls or participates or becomes
involved in it, the less he fits the role of a good faith purchaser
for value; the closer his relationship to the underlying agreement
which is the source of the note, the less need there is for giving
him the tension-free rights considered necessary in a fast moving,
credit-extending commercial world.35
Louisiana courts have consistently3' refused to recognize close
association as a grounds for denying holder in due course status,
principally because the courts have felt it was the duty of the legisla-
ture, not the courts, to change the "clear provisions" of Title VII of
the Revised Statutes.:7 However, the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law
provides the courts with enough of a change in legislative policy to
permit the development of a long needed,3 8 close connexity doctrine.
By seeing the Act as a step toward a more equitable balancing of the
rights and protections offered consumers and finance companies; by
noting the changes made in requirements for holder in due course
status-especially the change in the definition of good faith; by ex-
amining the vastly changed social and credit system in the United
States since the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law; by
reviewing the equitable considerations which went into the reasoning
of the many cases in other states establishing such a doctrine; and
by using sound civilian methodology in examining all the social, legis-
lative, doctrinal and jurisprudential changes; Louisiana courts could,
and should, make close connexity available as a viable legal protec-
tion for consumers.
Home Solicitation Sales
In the past decade, there has been much consumer activity di-
35. 50 N.J. at 109-10, 232 A.2d at 410.
36. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal did adopt the close connexity doctrine in
Citizens Loan Corp. v. Robbins, 40 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949), rehearing
denied, April 29, 1949. However, the supreme court specifically overruled this case in
White System v. Hall, 219 La. 444, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951). White System has been
followed since that time.
37. Note, 16 LoYOLA L. REv. 457, 465 (1970).
38. The concept of "close connexity" was first established in 1940 in the Arkansas
case of Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940). In this
case, the court said the finance company was "so closely connected with the entire
transaction that it cannot be heard to say that it, in good faith, was an innocent
purchaser .. " Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262. For an early assault on closely asso-
ciated finance companies and retailers claiming the benefits of holder in due course,
see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954).
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rected toward legislative protection from questionable door-to-door
sales practices." The most popular method urged is to allow the
consumer a "cooling off period""' in which to cancel purchase agree-
ments signed at his home.4' Theoretically, this period gives the con-
sumer an opportunity to reconsider the wisdom of the commitment
he has made without the adverse influence of the "high-pressure"
salesmen "fast-talking" him into "signing his name on the dotted
line."' 2 This premise is based on the idea that the consumer is less
able to resist high-pressure sales tactics when at home, because, un-
like at a store, he cannot simply walk out, nor is he likely to be so
inhospitable as to throw the overly forceful salesmen out. 3 In re-
sponse to these consumer pressures, statutes providing for a short
cooling off period have been adopted in several countries and in most
states," including Louisiana.
39. COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT, CMND. No. 1781, (1962)
[hereinafter cited as MOLONY REPORT]. The recommendations of the English commit-
tee on Consumer Protection (The Molony Committee) are generally cited as the origin
of governmental studies directed toward door-to-door sales practices. According to this
report, the activities of door-to-door salesmen "have provoked a greater wrath and
indignation . . . than any other single subject" discussed by witnesses at Committee
hearings. MOLONY REPORT 741.
40. See generally Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in Door-to-Door Sales,
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 717 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sherl; Project, The Direct Selling
Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 883 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Projectl; Comment, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 802 (1971); Note, 2 VAL. L. REV. 338 (1968). Other
proposals include industry controls through "chargeback" systems, better recruiting
of salesmen, and trade associations; government controls through licensing and injunc-
tive suits; post-sale remedies such as higher warranty requirements, suits for fraudu-
lent practices, stricter applications of unconscionability and more available legal serv-
ices to implement individual consumer protections. Some of the items sold most fre-
quently by means of a home solicitation sale include encyclopedias, cosmetics, maga-
zine subscriptions, small home applicances (vacuum cleaners, sewing machines, etc.),
roofing and siding installation and/or repairs, food freezer plans, cooking utensils and
wearing apparel.
See Meserve, The Proposed Federal Door-to-Door Sales Act: An Examination of
Its Effectiveness as a Consumer Remedy and the Constitutional Validity of Its En-
forcement Provisions, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (1969) Ihereinafter cited as
Federal Door-to-Door Sales Act], for another excellent overview of the problems asso-
ciated with door-to-door sales and the effectiveness of a cooling-off period.
41. See generally Sher at 721-37 (for the direct selling industry's arguments
against such a regulatory plan).
42. See Comment, 12 ARIz. L. REV. 803, 804 n.7 (1971); Sher at 721; Project at
895-922, 1008; Federal Door-to-Door Sales Act at 1177.
43. Federal Door-to-Door Sales Act at 1174; W. MAGNUSON AND J. CARPER, DARK
SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 105 (1968); Sher at 721-22, 725-30.
44. Only seven states (Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee and West Virginia) do not have statutes regulating home solicitation
sales.
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The Louisiana definition of a home solicitation sale" is nearly
identical to that of the UCCC,45 with one important difference. Tle
phrase defining a home solicitation sale as one solicited at "any place
other than the business establishment of the seller"47 considerably
broadens the scope of protection offered by the Louisiana provision
and closes an important loophole in the UCCC definition. The
Louisiana wording effectively includes sales which take place not only
at the consumer's home, but also at his neighbor's home, at sales
"parties" or at trade fairs. This seems to be a better approach and
offers greater protection for the consumer.
A potential problem created by the definition may arise because
of the exclusion of sales that have been "initiated by the consumer
by communication with the seller at his business establishment."49
Many direct sellers make use of advertising as a means of finding
potential customers. Honest department stores and other retailers
whose main business takes place at a fixed location but who also send
out salesmen to customers' homes to sell such items as carpeting and
central air conditioning will probably be benefited by this exclusion.'
However, the exclusion, which is not part of the UCCC definition,
45. LA. R.S. 9:3517(17) (Supp. 1972): "A 'home solicitation sale' is a consumer
credit sale of goods or services or both, other than motor vehicles, farm equipment or
services, in which the seller or a person acting for him engages in a personal solicitation
of the sale at any place other than the business establishment of the seller and the
consumer's agreement or offer to purchase is there given to the seller or a person acting
for him. It does not include a sale made pursuant to a pre-existing revolving charge
account, a pre-existing consumer credit sale agreement providing for a series of sales,
or a sale made pursuant to prior negotiations between the parties at a business estab-
lishment at a fixed location where goods or services are offered or exhibited for sale,
or a sale that may have been initiated by the consumer by communication with the
seller at his business establishment."
46. UCCC § 2.501: "'Home solicitation sale' means a consumer credit sale of
goods, other than farm equipment, or services in which the seller or a person acting
for him engages in a personal solicitation of the sale at a residence of the buyer and
the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is there given to the seller or a person acting
for him. It does not include a sale made pursuant to a preexisting revolving charge
account, or a sale made pursuant to prior negotiations between the parties at a busi-
ness establishment at a fixed location where goods or sercices are offered or exhibited
for sale."
47. LA. R.S. 9:3516(17) (Supp. 1972). Apparently, this wording was taken from
earlier working drafts of the UCCC. The wording is nearly identical to that of section
2.501 of working draft No. 6, 1967. This approach is also very similar to that of the
NCA § 2.501(2), which defines an "outside consumer approved transaction" as one
"initiated or consumated personally by a merchant at a place other than the mer-
chant's place of business."
48. Sher at 751 n.148.
49. LA. R.S. 9:3516(17) (Supp. 1972).
50. See Sher at 752-54.
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will undoubtedly be used by unscrupulous businessmen as a means
of escaping the coverage of the Act. One of the most misleading sales
techniques, "bait advertising and switch selling"'" depends upon con-
sumers responding to advertised "specials." In such situations the
consumer could be seen as initiating the transaction by "communi-
cating with the seller at his business establishment" thereby freeing
the "switch-seller" from the possibility of rescission. One way to limit
the exclusion would be to equate "business establishment" with "re-
tail outlet," not a mere office. In any event, if the basic intent behind
the restrictions on home solicitation sales is to protect consumers in
their own homes from poor business practices and pressure tactics,
then the restrictions should be applicable no matter how the seller
came to be there."2
Both the Louisiana Act and the UCCC allow the consumer to
cancel a home solicitation sale until midnight of the third business
day after the agreement is signed. 53 The consumer is not given the
51. "Bait and switch" selling tactics have been described as follows: "The first
step is to issue an advertisement purporting to offer a domestic article such as a sewing
machine at a remarkable low price, and inviting interested persons to write in for
details. Anyone who does so is soon confronted by a salesman on his doorstep, announc-
ing that he has called in response to the householder's inquiry for a demonstration. In
a typical case, the advertised article is then produced, but the salesman makes no
effort to sell it, on the contrary, he is only too ready to point out and demonstrate its
defects, or to explain that because of a long waiting list delivery cannot be made for
several months. The customer, having thus been induced to say this is of no use to
him-and, incidentally to view the visitor as an honest and reasonable caller-the
'switch' is made. It so happens that the salesman has another model in his car, which
might possibly interest his victim, might he be allowed to bring it in and to demon-
strate it? The customer having so far seen only Dr. Jekyll and having a slightly uneasy
conscience about having brought this pleasant man so far on a fruitless.errand, readily
agrees; whereupon a far more expensive article is produced and Mr. Hyde takes over."
MOLONY REPORT 743.
52. MOLONY REPORT 528.
53. LA. R.S. 9:3538(1) (Supp. 1972): "[I]n addition to any right otherwise to
revoke an offer, the consumer has the right to cancel a home solicitation sale until
midnight of the third business day after the day on which the consumer signs an
agreement or offer to purchase." See UCCC § 2.502. Regulation Z of the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act (PL 90-321) also provides for a similar rescission
period in any credit transaction in which a security interest in the consumer's principal
residence is acquired. Thus, in home solicitation sales in which a security interest is
acquired (such as many siding or roofing contracts), the consumer has a dual right to
rescind during the cooling-off period.
Regulation Z also provides that "a business day is any calendar day except Sun-
day and those legal holidays specified in section 6103(a) of title 5 of the United States
Code." Section 2269(a), footnote 14, effective October 1, 1971. These holidays include
New Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor
Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day. (See also
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
right to cancel if "the consumer requests the seller to provide goods
or services without delay because of an emergency'' 4 and (a) the
seller makes a substantial beginning of performance,"5 and (b) in the
case of goods, they cannot be returned in as good condition as when
delivered to the consumer." This waiver of the right to cancel does
not make much sense in the context of a home solicitation sale. There
is some question as to what kind of goods or services could be offered
by an unsolicited door-to-door salesman that a consumer would need
in an emergency. While there definitely are times when a consumer
will need to enter into credit transactions in legitimate emergency
situations (after hurricanes, fires, floods, etc.), in most such cases he
would make the first contact, thus taking such a sale out of the
heading of "home solicitation" anyway. 7 Also, as the emergency
waiver is not required to be in writing, this provision may give unscru-
pulous companies a loophole through the protection afforded the con-
sumer.
In non-emergency situations, the seller must obtain the con-
sumer's signature on a written contract which contains notice of the
consumer's right to cancel." This notice cannot be hidden in fine
print but must be "conspicuously captioned" "CONSUMER'S
RIGHT TO CANCEL." 51 This type notice has been criticized by
direct sellers as "an invitation to cancel,"'" but it does improve the
consumer's chances of knowing such a remedy is available. If the
seller does not provide the consumer with such a written agreement
containing the required notice, then the consumer may cancel the
sale at any time, in any manner and by any means."
The statutorily required wording, however, is somewhat mislead-
NCA § 2.105.) This seems to be a very workable definition and should probably be
adopted in Louisiana in order to maintain uniformity with the federal act. Of course,
some variation as to which days are to be considered legal holidays is expectable in
order to reflect local practices.
See also LA. R.S. 9:2711 (Supp. 1970) (which permits "any person" signing a
purchase agreement with an "itinerant door-to-door salesman" to withdraw his con-
sent to the agreement providing he does so within a three-day period commencing on
the day following the making of the agreement).
54. LA. R.S. 9:3538(E) (Supp. 1972). Apparently, the "emergency" exclusion to
the right of rescission does not affect the non-negotiability of any notes taken in such
a transaction. See text at notes 78-82 infra.
55. LA. R.S. 9:3538 E (1) (Supp. 1972).
56. Id. 9:3538 E (2) (Supp. 1972).
57. See the definition of "home solicitation sale" at note 45 supra.
58. LA. R.S. 9:3539 A (Supp. 1972).
59. Id. 9:3539 B (1) (Supp. 1972).
60. Sher at 730.
61. LA. R.S. 9:3539 C (Supp. 1972).
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ing. The sentence warning the consumer that if he cancels, "the seller
may keep all or part of your cash down payment," 2 does not seem to
adequately inform the buyer that the maximum amount the seller
can retain is limited to five percent of the purchase price.13 In some
situations a buyer who puts down a large percentage of the purchase
price may not want to cancel because of the fear of losing the whole
sum, even though he is entitled to a substantial refund.
In normal situations where the proper required notice is given,
the consumer can cancel by giving written notice of cancellation at
the seller's address." The cancellation can also take effect when de-
posited in a mailbox, properly addressed and stamped. 5 The notice
of cancellation does not have to be in any particular form as long as
it indicates the consumer's intention not to be bound by the agree-
ment, " nor does the consumer have to give, or have, any reason to
cancel; he may do so for any reason whatsoever. 7
If the consumer does cancel, the seller has ten days in which to
return any notes or other evidence of indebtedness as well as any
trade-ins or payments given.6" This requirement is given subject to
the seller's right to retain a cancellation fee of five percent of the cash
price or the amount of the cash down payment (whichever is smaller)
as long as the seller complies with his obligations.' If the seller takes
goods as a trade-in, while they are in his possesion the risk of loss of
those goods remain with him if the consumer should cancel.70 In addi-
tion, the consumer can retain possession of any goods delivered with
62. Id. 9:3539 B (2) (Supp. 1972).
63. Id. 9:3540 C (Supp. 1972).
64. Id. 9:3538 B (Supp. 1972).
65. Id. 9:3538 C (Supp. 1972).
66. Id. 9:3538 D (Supp. 1972).
67. Any interpretation of this act which would require a consumer to have a
"reason" to cancel would vitiate the protection afforded, The intent seems to be to
allow consumers an opportunity to overcome the effects of a high pressure salesman.
Thus to require a reason would mean that a consumer who felt that something was
wrong with the "deal" he just signed, yet is unable to articulate the feeling, could be
denied the possibility of cancelling. Yet it would seem that he is the very person the
Act is trying to protect.
68. LA. R.S. 9:3540 A, B (Supp. 1972). A consumer who signs a promissory note
in connection with a home solicitation sale can be fairly certain that the seller will be
able to return the note if the contract is cancelled, as R.S. 9:3532(2) declares that notes
taken in connection with a home solicitation sale shall be non-negotiable.
69. Id. 9:3540 C (Supp. 1972).
70. Id. 9:3540 B (Supp. 1972).
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a privilege for the amount due until the seller complies with his
obligation to refund the down payments."
After the consumer has cancelled, he has a reasonable time (pre-
sumed to be 40 days) in which to tender to the seller any goods
delivered.72 He is not obliged to tender them at any place other than
at his home."' If the seller does not demand possession within that 40
day period, the goods become the consumer's with no obligation to
pay for them.7 The consumer who has possession of goods not yet
repossessed by the seller has only a duty of reasonable care and any
other risk of loss is on the seller." Thus, the consumer is not obligated
to return the goods; it is up to the seller who delivered them.
Home solicitation sales are not treated lightly by the Louisiana
Act.7" Not only are consumers given the right to rescind during the
cooling off period, but any notes taken in connection with such a sale
are deemed non-negotiable,77 thereby precluding transferees from
gaining holder in due course status. A problem in this regard is cre-
ated by the lack of a requirement that such evidences of indebtedness
be labelled so as to identify the paper as one taken in a home solicita-
tion sale.7' It is therefore probable that some door-to-door sales com-
panies will try to negotiate notes taken in a home solicitation sale.
Because of the likelihood of such an event, finance companies will
have to make it part of their normal business practices to determine
if home solicitation sales are part of the attempted assignor's market-
ing scheme. '" Finance companies should be held to a "red flag" test:
if there is any reason for them to believe the note came from a home
solicitation sale, they must make a bona fide effort to determine how
it was acquired."' It is reasonably argued that even in the event that
71. Id. 9:3540 D (Supp. 1972).
72. Id. 9:3541 A (Supp. 1972).
73. Id.
74, Id.
75. Id. 9:3541 B (Supp. 1972).
76. See also GOVERNOR'S CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION RULES AND REGULATIONS,
Tit. 3, Ch. II, § 5002, which prohibits certain magazine and periodical subscription
sales practices.
77. LA. R.S. 9:3532 B (Supp. 1972).
78. Such a labeling is required by Arizona law. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-5004 (Supp.
1970-71).
79. Such will undoubtedly be the practice in order that the assignee can protect
himself from buying paper which could be subject to cancellation and over which they
would not be able to gain holder in due course status.
80. It would seem reasonable to assume that courts could analogize section 3534
(3)(a) of the Act to this situation and require that assignee "should have asked" if the
instrument was taken in connection with a home solicitation sale.
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a transferee should acquire without any reason to believe the note is
non-negotiable, he should not be given holder in due course status.
Here again is the clash between two "innocents," but in such a situa-
tion, because of the strict language of section 3532(2), the consumer
should prevail.8
Referral Sales
"One of the most vicious and fastest growing"82 misleading sales
practices today is referral selling. Typically a salesman using this
scheme will propose to reduce the price of the goods by offering re-
bates (or "commissions") if the consumer supplies the seller with
names of friends or other prospects who will also agree to buy the
seller's product. By offering "commissions," the seller hopes to entice
the consumer into agreeing to purchase, on time, a generally much
over-priced item which may seem cheap because of the promised
rebates. However, the consumer frequently finds that his friends do
not want the same merchandise, or the company does not use the
leads provided at all, preferring to negotiate the notes taken to a third
party holder in due course. Thus the consumer would be obligated to
pay off the entire debt without the benefit of any of the promised
reductions."'
The Louisiana Act treats such schemes very harshly. It not only
forbids the offering of rebates or discounts to consumers in return for
the consumer's supplying names of other prospective customers if the
rebate is contingent on a future event (the referee's agreeing to buy
the product);"4 it also prohibits the seller from enforcing the contract
and allows the purchaser to either rescind the agreement or keep the
goods without any obligation to pay for them." Referral agreements
are not forbidden if the rebate is not based on some future occurrence,
but merely requires, for example, providing a list of prospective pur-
chasers. "
This is one of the strongest sections of the Act because of the
remedies available to the consumer. However, it does raise some
81. This would be the effect of the Arizona Home Solicitation and Referral Sales
Act. See Comment, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 819 (1970-71).
82. W. MAGNUSON AND J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 13 (1968).
83. LA. R.S. 9:3536 (Supp. 1972).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. In some cases, such an agreement could be considered an unfair trade practice
if the seller is involved in a multi-level distribution (pyramid sales marketing) scheme.
GOVERNOR'S CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION, RULES AND REGULATIONS, Title 3, Ch. II,
§ 5001.
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questions. The first is the problem of proof as the written contracts
would not evidence the verbal, side agreements promising the re-
bates. Another area of uncertainty would be the effect of the rights
of holders in due course of notes taken in connection with such a
scheme. Is such a sale a newly created, valid defense against a holder
in due course, or does the consumer's alternative of not paying for the
goodsapply only to obligations owed the seller? Seemingly, for the
protection offered by this section to be effective, it should do away
with the buyer's obligation entirely, even as to holders in due course,
for otherwise the consumer would still be bound to pay the price. .'"
Right To Prepay With A Guaranteed Rebate Of Unearned Interest
Another limitation on what may be "agreed" to in a consumer
credit transaction is the section permitting the consumer to prepay
in full the unpaid balance at any time, even if a contrary provision
is included in the. contract)' This prohibits extenders of credit from
hiding such a provision in fine print in an attempt to prevent a
consumer who wants to prepay from doing so.
Upon prepayment in full,"" or in case maturity is accelerated and
a suit is filed," the creditor is required to refund any unearned service
or loan finance charges."' The rebate is computed by using the "Rule
of 78's" or "Sum of the Digits" method.'" If less than half the install-
86.1. In analogous situations, the courts have declared certain instruments void
as a matter of public policy. See McLean v. Elliot, 26 La. Ann. 385 (1874); Wainwright
v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234 (1867); Coburn Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 241 So. 2d 802 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1970); Williamson v. Humphries, 201 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962);
Soileau v. Pitre, 79 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955); W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Coen,
195 So. 660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
87. LA. R.S. 9:3527 (Supp. 1972).
88. Id. 9:3528 (Supp. 1972).
89. Id. 9:3529 (Supp. 1972).
90. Id. 9:3528 (Supp. 1972).
91. Id. The Louisiana Act defines the "Rule of 78" method of rebate as the "refund
lof] unearned loan finance charges or credit service charges" representing "at least
as great a proportion of the loan finance charge or credit service charge. . . as the sum
of the monthly time balances beginning one month after the month in which prepay-
ment is made, bears to the sum of all the monthly time balances under the schedule
of payments in the contract."
The term "monthly time balances" refers to the amount of money outstanding
during the month or "unit" of debt. Thus, given a twelve month loan, the first month
can be conceptualized as being represented by the numeral 12 because the outstanding
balance is 12 times as large during the first month as during the last. The second month
would be represented by the numeral 11, the third by 10 and so on to 1. The portion
of the interest considered earned by the creditor is 12/78 for the first month, 11/78 for
the second, 10/78 for the third, and so on (12+11+10+ . . . . +1=78 which represents
the whole of the precomputed interest; hence the name "Rule of 78's"). Therefore, to
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ment term has passed, a prepayment charge of not more than $25.00
may be first deducted from the total outstanding precomputed serv-
ice or finance charge before determining the rebate.92 This "prepay-
ment charge" is a direct holdover from the charge permitted in the
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,93 and would be forbidden under
both the UCCC and the NCA.9 '
The Louisiana Act does not provide for partial prepayments-it
only permits prepayments in full. Therefore, partial prepayments
would only be allowed if agreed to by the creditor. Also, the rebate
provisions would not apply to such prepayments. While the UCCC
also only permits prepayments in full, 5 the NCA would allow both,9
and would require rebates for the partial prepayments."
Balloon Payments
Another scheme, known as "balloon payments," has been effec-
tive in inducing unwary buyers into signing very burdensome con-
tracts. This plan works by offering small installment payments, until
the last payment, when suddenly a much larger amount is due. The
frequent result is that the consumer defaults and the goods are repos-
sessed. The Louisiana Act deals with this abusive tactic by giving
consumers the right to refinance the amount of the final payment at
determine the amount of rebate, add the total percentage of interest earned
(12/78+11/78+10/78 etc.) and multiply times the total precomputed interest. Thus if
the debtor prepays at the end of the fourth month, the interest earned would be
12/78+ 11/78+10/78+9/78=42/78 and the rebate due would be 78/78-42/78= 36/78 of the
total finance charge.
However, the computations are somewhat more complicated in practice because
of the great variety in the amounts and prepayment periods of credit transactions.
Therefore, many lenders use published rebate tables rather than computing each
transaction as needed.
92. LA. R.S. 9:3528 (Supp. 1972).
93. Id. 6:958A (Supp. 1972). This Act allows not only the prepayment charge, but
also allows the creditor to compute his rebate on the basis of 90 percent of the "Rule
of 78's."
94. Section 2.209 of the UCCC specifically permits prepayment at any time with-
out penalty, subject to the rebate provisions of section 2.210. Section 2.210(2) allows
the creditor to retain the minimum credit service charge as determined by section
2.201(6) ($5.00 if the amount financed is less than $75.00 or $7.50 when the amount
financed exceeds $75.00) if the credit service charge earned subsequent to prepayment
is less than the minimum charge contracted. NCA section 2.209 guarantees the right
to repay without penalty and section 2.210 does not provide for retention by the
creditor of any other fees than earned finance charges as computed by the actuarial
method.
95. UCCC § 2.209.
96. NCA § 2.209.
97. Id. § 2.210(1).
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terms which are no less favorable than those of the original contract."
Under this provision, the size of the installment payments cannot be
larger, nor can the credit service charge rate be greater. This right
seems to effectively prevent the worst abuse of such a scheme-that
of "reaching a compromise" with the defaulting consumer by allow-
ing him to refinance the amount due at a much higher interest rate. 9
However, some commentators have questioned permitting balloon
payments at all."' By prohibiting them altogether, except in special
situations when needed to reflect the consumer's irregular income,
the abuses would be prevented and creditors would not be unduly
prevailed upon. I' l
The section does not apply to payment schedules which are ar-
ranged to fit a consumer's irregular or seasonal income."" In such a
situation, the problem of overwhelmingly large payments is not as
likely to arise. Also, specifically excluded are credit transactions
which are primarily for agricultural purposes or are part of a revolving
charge or loan account." 3 The reason for excluding agricultural pur-
poses is somewhat unclear,"'4 the major factor seemingly being the
seasonality of the income. However, such situations seem well within
the contemplation of the "seasonal or irregular income" clause.
Frank S. Craig, III
98. LA. R.S. 9:3535 (Supp. 1972). This section is almost identical to UCCC section
2.405 which applies to consumer credit sales and section 3.402 which applies to con-
sumer loans.
99. In Time Finance Co. v. Louis, 152 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), the
defendants purchased a car, agreeing to pay 23 installments of $75.00 each and a final
balloon payment of $1,975. Defendants paid all 23 regular installments but were un-
able to make the last "impossible" payment. They then signed another note for $2,952
to re-finance the amount due on the first note. After paying off over $1,800 on the
second note, defendant defaulted, the finance company seized the car, sued for the
remaining debt, and was awarded a judgment.
100. Kass, S.2589 and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Comparison of
Consumer Protections, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (1969).
101. This is basically the approach taken by the NCA in section 2.402. This Act
allows the consumer with an irregular income to revise the schedule of payments at
any time (section 2.402(3)). See also NCCF at 39.
102. LA. R.S. 9:3535 (Supp. 1972).
103. Id.
104. Kass, S.2589 and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Comparison of
Consumer Protections, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1146 (1969). Agricultural credit
transactions are normally excluded from coverage by the various consumer credit acts
because they are considered to be a "business" rather than a "consumer" transaction.
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